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Abstract 
The foreign policy and regional posture of the Islamic Republic of Iran is often assessed through a securitized lens, 
not only by its current regional and international adversaries, but also in much of the academic discourse that 
surrounds its international relations and diplomacy. This paper seeks to reappraise this approach by presenting a 
hitherto unexplored face of Iranian foreign policy – one that is articulated through its efforts to present regional 
diplomatic solutions aimed at reducing tensions in the Middle East. 
As a country often defined in terms of its sectarian identity and the hyperbole around its regional role and influence, 
the Islamic Republic provides an interesting test case for the notion of desectarianization. Iran’s position as the pre-
eminent Shi’i majority power in the region has presented it with opportunities to draw on its historical confessional 
linkages, but it also singles it out as a unique case. Building upon the theoretical and conceptual frameworks 
provided by the sectarianization thesis, desecuritization and insights from diplomatic studies, this paper presents 
empirical examples from Iran’s Eurasian and religious diplomacy that provide a potential starting point for 
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The foreign policy and regional posture of the Islamic Republic of Iran is often assessed through a securitised 
lens, not only by its current regional and international adversaries, but also in much of the academic discourse 
that surrounds its international relations and diplomacy. There is, however, an alternative to such an outlook, 
which can be found in the machinations of Iranian diplomacy in other areas away from the media gaze and 
popular debates that try to reduce all regional tensions to an immutable, centuries old sectarian conflict. This 
can be seen in Iran’s multilateral diplomacy, particularly when facing north and east – and thus away from 
the Middle East’s current ‘hot spots’, and in elements of its cultural diplomacy. It is within the diplomatic 
field that significant potential for de-securitization, and beyond that possible de-sectarianization, exists. 
This work seeks to build on Hashemi and Postel’s (2017) sectarianization thesis, which critiques primordial 
understandings of the current turmoil in the Middle East, and in which the role of political actors is 
highlighted as a prominent feature in international relations in the region. The sectarianization thesis helps 
to explain the rise of sect-based conflicts in the Middle Eastern context, which has been exacerbated in recent 
years. For Hashemi and Postel (2017, p.4) sectarianisation is “…an active process shaped by political actors 
operating within specific contexts, pursuing political goals that involve the mobilization of popular 
sentiments around particular religious identity markers. Class dynamics, fragile states, and geopolitical 
rivalries also shape the sectarianization.” Accordingly, the role of political actors seeking to mobilize 
religious differences to maintain their power has been assumed to be the main factor in the rise of tensions 
in the Middle East. The regional nature of sectarianization across the Middle East can be challenged through 
diplomatic efforts towards desectarianization of the regional security environment. With this in mind, we 
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argue that as the role of political actors in increasing sectarianization in the region cannot be denied, the 
same desire can challenge the process towards one of desectarianization, resulting in a reduction in conflicts 
across the Middle East. Although little has been written in terms of desectarianization as a response to the 
sectarianization thesis, it can be viewed as aligning with diversr diplomatic efforts to decrease conflicts and 
tensions in the region.   
In this paper, we utilise insights from studies on diplomacy and mediation to show how two aspects of Iran’s 
diplomacy –in terms of both its traditional economic and security relationships in the Eurasian sphere, and 
its cultural and religious diplomacy more broadly – could provide a starting point for potential 
desectarianization. Valuable insights into how de-securitization can be enacted are provided by Neumann’s 
(2012) concept of ‘diplomatisation’, which is used to emphasise how diplomacy can act as a valuable tool 
for political stabilisation. In the case of Iran, we note how, contrary to conventional wisdom, the Islamic 
Republic has historically emphasised diplomatic solutions to regional security issues, in a range of fora and 
through a number of proposed initiatives such as non-aggression pacts between Middle Eastern powers and 
moves toward establishing a regional security architecture. It does this through a ‘region-first’ conception of 
security that draws on its experience of Eurasian diplomacy since the end of the Cold War, which is informed 
by its desire to maintain independence in its foreign policy and counter US-led containment efforts.  The 
paper begins by outlining the theoretical underpinnings of securitization, de-securitization and 
diplomatisation, before going on to provide illustrative examples of Iran’s de-securitizing diplomacy in 
practice.  It is through such examples that one can see the potential for political action that enhances the 
possibilities for desectarianization, insofar as it relates to the complex geopolitical rivalries that exist in the 
Middle East. 
Securitization and De-securitization 
      The sectarianization process noted above utilizes the securitization framework; thus, to address 
desectarianization, it is necessary to discuss securitization and de-securitization processes. The causes of the 
end of Cold War led to a ‘rethink’ of the concept of ‘security’ (Haas, 2007, p.145). In this context, the 
Copenhagen School’s rethinking of the concept of security introduced securitization theory to International 
Relations (Wæver, 1989; Wæver, 1995, p.58; Wæver, 2015, p.122; Balzacq et al., 2016, p.497; Hansen, 
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2012, p.538). The main contributions of the Copenhagen School to Security Studies can be discussed through 
two agendas: first, by ‘widening’ the sectors and level of analysis to the military, political, economic, societal 
and environmental; secondly, by deepening the concept of security through securitization theory (Buzan et 
al., 1998). More specifically, securitization theory, which is based on the assumptions of Constructivism, 
post-Structuralism and neo-Realism (Balzacq et al., 2016, p.518), claims that “security is not something that 
is simply out there waiting to be discovered”. Instead, it is ‘self-referential’ (Roe, 2004, p.281), in which the 
‘successful’ rhetoric of security accepted by the audience change the situation (Kurowska and Reshetnikov, 
2018, p.349). 
The role of political actors is prominent in securitization theory, and the emphasis on the speech act by the 
Copenhagen School demonstrates that ‘something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so’ 
(Wæver, 1995, p.54, 1989, 2003; Buzan et al., 1998). Thus, the elites who use this ‘order’ can undeniably 
manipulate it for their specific ‘self-serving’ aims that cannot easily be eliminated (Wæver, 1995, p.55). 
Consequently, securitization ‘combines the politics of threat design with that of threat management’ (Wæver, 
2011, p.472; Balzacq et al., 2016, p.495; Balzacq, 2010, p.3). In securitization theory, the possibility of threat 
management leads to a binary process, in which a threat can be securitized or desecuritized based on the 
specific context and the desire of political actors.  
     Regarding the Middle East, there has often been a sense of fear of  the ‘other’ among the audience, which 
causes securitization of the ‘other’ to happen easily in the region. For instance, in 2004, King Abdullah II of 
Jordan coined the term “Shi’a Crescent” (al-Hilal ash-Shi’i). The king stated that Iran posed a security threat 
to the U.S. and its allies by expanding its influence to shift the ‘balance of power’ after the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 (Wright & Baker, 2004, A01). The speech act focuses on the fear of Arab rulers from rising 
Shi’a power in the region, regarding post-Saddam Iraq as an Iranian ally. The term has been used by political 
actors and academics in different ways, such as “Shi’a revival”, “Shi’a rising”, “Shi’a renaissance”, “Shi’a 
international”, “Shi’a Empire”, “Shiitestan”, “Shi’a block” and “Shi’a awakening”, as well as “Pan-Shi’ism” 
(Nasr, 2006; Terhalle, 2007; Takeyh, 2006; Escobar, 2007; Ehteshami, 2006). However, one might argue 
that the notion of a “Shi’a Crescent” is a failed term that merely serves its advocates, rather than revealing 
the reality on the ground, for which the region has paid a hefty price (Broning, 2008). With this in mind, the 
foreign policy of Iran emphasises unity rather than sectarianism in the region. In December 2015 at the 
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International Islamic Conference, Iranian president Hassan Rouhani declared that using either “Shi’a 
Crescent or Sunni triangle is wrong; instead, it is an Islamic moon” (IRNA, 2015). 
Religious identity has therefore been easily securitized, and as such there is a corollary to the sectarianization 
thesis, and beyond its de-securitization and possibly desectarianization. Hashemi and Postel (2017) arguably 
fill the gap in securitization theory in two ways. First, although security sectors in securitization theory are 
broadened to include military, political, economic, societal and environmental actors, religion has largely 
been neglected as a factor in it (Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver & Laustsen 2000; Balzacq et al., 2016). However, 
by emphasising how political actors pursue political goals that involve religious identity markers, Hashemi 
and Postel (2017) introduce the prescient role that religion or religious identity can play. Secondly, 
securitization theory has been criticized because it emphasizes a ‘western understanding’ of security 
(Wilkinson, 2007, p.5; Wilkinson, 2010, p.96; Bilgin, 2011), whereas the sectarianization thesis helps sheds 
light on the specific contexts of the Middle East as far as securitizing practices are understood and articulated. 
The government of Iran also, at times, views regional politics through a securitized lens. This can be seen in 
its pronouncements on its fight against ‘takfiri’ extremist groups, Daesh chief among them, in Iraq and Syria, 
where such action is tied to maintaining Iran’s own national security. Domestic terror attacks within Iran are  
subesequently attributed to regional adversaries, as seen in acusations of Saudi funding for Baloch and 
Ahwazi separatists. This is due to the pressures Iran faces in terms of hostile states in the region, as well as 
hostile non-regional powers with a foothold in the Middle East, namely the US. In so doing, the Islamic 
Republic utilises a language familiar to analysts of US foreign policy and security studies, insofar as Iran is 
seen as fighting its own ‘War on Terror’ against extremist forces (Wastnidge, 2020), which are seen as being 
supported by its regional foes and the US. This is a narrative that sees Iran as a victim of misguided security 
policies by hostile states, as regularly noted by key Iranian political leaders. In an attempt to counter such 
forces, Rouhani proposed the ‘World Against Violence and Extremism’ (WAVE) initiative to the United 
Nations in his maiden General Assembly speech in 2013, and subsequently sought to institutionalise this 
through annual fora to promote and further develop the concept. Speaking at the United Nations General 
Assembly in 2018, just after the killing of 25 members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, 
Rouhani (2018a) stated: “As victims of terrorism in the past and today, we have always been and will always 
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remain in the forefront of genuine confrontation with terrorism.” Similarly, in a speech to US foreign policy 
experts in New York during the same visit, Rouhani (2018b) stated: 
Iran’s presence in Syria is based on the invitation of the government of the country to fight terrorism. 
We are the victim of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. This is why when the governments 
of Syria and Iraq called for help in the fight against terrorism, we went there without hesitation. 
  De-securitization 
The binary processes of securitization and desecuritization have raised debates on which is more effective 
in International Relations (Balzacq & Guzzini, 2015; Guzzini, 2015). Leading scholars in the field have 
argued that it is essential to work more on desecuritization, due to its ‘optimal long-range political goal’ 
(Wæver, 2003, p.12; Buzan et al., 1998, p.210). Huysmans (1998, p.587) argues that securitization as a 
political choice emphasises ‘antogonism’, while desecuritization attempts to break such a view.  In this 
respect, Kim and Lee (2011, p.51) note that the process of de-securitization can be viewed as a transformation 
of issues from ‘high politics’ into ‘low politics’. Consequently, the main aim of de-securitization is ‘the 
effort to keep issues off the security agenda’ (Wæver, 1995, p.58). In terms of keeping the issues off such 
an agenda, or how to desecuritize, Roe (2004, p.284) and Wæver (2000, p.253) point to the strategy of 
keeping the responses in forms that do not generate security dilemmas and other vicious spirals. There are 
different ways to desecuritize an issue, on which the literature of desecuritization can be categorised into 
four types. As Hansen (2012, p.529) argues: 
Change through stabilisation is when an issue is cast in terms other than security, but where the 
larger conflict still looms; replacement is when an issue is removed from the securitised, while 
another securitisation takes its place; rearticulation is when an issue is moved from the securitised 
to the politicised due to a resolution of the threats and dangers that underpinned the original 
securitisation; and silencing is when desecuritisation takes the form of a depoliticisation, which 
marginalises potentially insecure subjects. 
         The crucial factor in the process of desecuritization is the actors’ tendency to fail in a security speech 
act. Empirical studies on desecuritization could help to apply it to other cases in this field, e.g. the experiences 
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of East-West relations in 1989, which shifted the securitized environment to a de-securitized one. In this 
regard, Wæver (1995, p.60) notes that: 
By turning threats into challenges and security into politics, the détente-oriented actors of the West 
tried to get elites in the East to avoid applying the term “security” to issues … it did play an 
important role in the process of softening that allowed another form of change to take place. Détente, 
as negotiated desecuritization and limitation of the use of security speech act, contributed to sudden 
desecuritization through a speech act failure. 
In the process of de-securitization, ‘historical’ antagonism can easily escalate the ‘present’ threat perceptions 
that postpone the de-securitization process. For example, the long historical ‘enmity’ of Germany and Russia, 
Korea and China of Japan, Greece and Armenia of Turkey, and more specifically Arabs versus Persians can 
be considered as cases of threat perception in the contemporary world (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 1998, 
pp.59–60). As long as these states persist with historical antagonism in their relations, the desecuritization 
process cannot easily be achieved. The most successful experience of desecuritization can be seen in Europe. 
In this regard, Wæver (2000, p.250; 2003, p.13) notes that a remarkable case of desecuritization is ‘European 
integration’, in which ‘potential rivals’ succeeded in the process of desecuritization. Although, in the process 
of desecuritization, issues differ case by case and country by country, even in the same region (Kim and Lee, 
2011, p.27).  
      Referring to desecuritization in different regions, the importance of identity politics in the Middle East 
may make the process more complex than in other regions. As Buzan and, Wæver (2009, p.261) argue, the 
roots of securitization lie at the heart of ‘identity politics of self and other’. Consequently, the 
desecuritization process requires rapprochement of the ‘friend-enemy distinction’ (Hansen, 2012, p.533). 
Regarding desecuritization of the other, which is more prominent in terms of minority groups, Roe (2004, 
p.290) argues that to achieve “a-security” and prevent security utterances about minority groups, it is 
essential to avoid speaking about group distinctiveness. As previously noted in regard to the Middle East 
and the wider Muslim world, the Shi’a have often been perceived as a security threat to Sunni majorities. 
For instance, Iran with its Shi’a majority population has been viewed as a threat by Arab rulers whose rivalry 
with Iran has long dominated the security calculations of Middle Eastern states (Mabon, 2018, p.45).  
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      One of the more successful processes of desecuritization in the Middle East can be seen in the relations 
between Turkey on the one hand, and its allies Iran and Syria on the other, in the current decade. Although, 
for a long time, the relationship between Turkey and Iran and Syria was based on hyperbolic ‘threat 
perceptions’, a desecuritization process has replaced enmity with amity in their relations (Aras & Polat, 
2008, pp.512–513). It is essential to consider that political actors play a prominent role that allows both 
securitization and desecuritization processes to occur. In this respect, Aydindag and Isiksal (2018, pp.294–
295) discuss the successful process of desecuritization in the case of Iran and Turkey during the period of 
former Prime Minister Erbakan, who attempted to apply desecuritization in domestic and foreign policy.   
     As discussed earlier, desecuritization is seen as an active and positive process in Security Studies, but 
there are also critiques of it. In this regard, Hansen (2012, p.530) states that “de-securitisation happens 
through speech acts, but there is not, strictly speaking ‘a’ de-securitizing speech act such as ‘I at this moment 
declare this issue to no longer be a threat’”. Therefore, it is not clear when exactly desecuritization happens, 
because there is no speech act declaring when a security threat no longer poses an actual threat. Such issues 
occur because of ‘a linear temporality between securitisation and de-securitisation, in which the actors have 
the time and space to intervene’ (Austin & Beaulieu-Brossard, 2018, p.310).  
De-securitization through Diplomacy  
One way of responding to some of the aforementioned critiques within debates around de-securitization can 
be found in the more applied articulation proposed by Neuman (2012), through the idea of ‘diplomatisation’. 
Diplomatisation can be seen as a form of political stabilisation and hence de-securitization. In articulating 
the ways in which a securitized issue can become ‘diplomatised’, as opposed to ‘violised’, Neumann (2012, 
p.12) conceives it as ‘…where a certain case of conflict goes from being primarily treated as an issue of 
security, with the institutionalised consequences that have in terms of military deployments the possible 
Ministry of Defence involvement, etc., towards being treated primarily as an issue of diplomacy’. This is an 
idea that is applied by Neuman to third-party intervention, focusing on the empirical example of Norway’s 
role as a historical mediating power, but it provides a useful framework for alternative outcomes to 
securitized problems. Thus, Neumann argues that it is possible to move away from the usual trajectory of 
issues becoming securitized and towards war and violence, as outlined below: 


















(Neumann, 2011, pp. 9–10) 
As Neuman (2012, p.11) notes, ‘A parallel may be drawn between diplomacy and securitisation theory in 
this regard; they are both beginning with observation and keeping options for applied recommendations 
open, and yet there is a clear bias in favour of de-securitisation.’  In the following examples, one can see the 
possibilities that exist for de-securitization through the diplomatic initiatives undertaken by Iran. While 
noting Hansesn’s (2012) argument that de-securitizing speech acts are by their nature difficult to define and 
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‘pronounce’, there is the possibility that ‘action’, as an extrapolation of ‘act’, might provide greater utility 
for de-securitization. In this domain it is the actions of key diplomatic personalities in promoting objectives 
that are consistent with the other parties’ interests and speaking a language of ‘rights’ rather than ‘demands’ 
(Neuman, 2012, p.10) that is key. It is therefore our contention that within such activities, the potential for 
de-securitization exists, thus paving the way for a possible desectarianization of regional geopolitical rivalry 
in the Middle East. 
Iranian Diplomatic Initiatives and Steps Towards De-securitization  
Tehran has developed a wide concept of regional security (Herzig, 2001, p.189), which is more akin to 
Buzan’s conception of security being not only concerned with traditional political-military relations, but also 
greater interaction in the cultural, social and economic sectors (Buzan, 1991, p.2). In the following brief 
empirical illustrations, we divide this into two main approaches, covering what can be conceived of as: i) 
more ‘traditional’ security approaches that focus on regional security politics and potential security 
architectures; and ii) initiatives that focus on culture and religion. It is within these examples that one can 
see the potential of Neuman’s approach towards de-securitization, with its emphasis on diplomacy. It is in 
Iran’s diplomatic manoeuvres that the potential for de-securitization and subsequent desectarianization 
arguably exists. 
i) ‘Traditional’ Approaches   
Moving away for a moment from the well-covered and hotly debated field that concerns Iran’s position in 
the Middle East, particularly vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and other US allies, a look at Iran’s policies towards its 
northern neighbours provides an interesting case of pragmatic, multilateral diplomacy.  In Iran’s approach 
tow Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and its relations with Russia and China, we see a strong emphasis on 
regionalism, multilateralism and the institutionalisation of key initiatives aiming to promote wider Eurasian 
stability.  Here we see how Iran has sought to utilise multilateral diplomacy in its Eurasian outlook, which 
provides a potential model for cooperation in the Middle East. 
The legal status of the Caspian Sea has remained undetermined since the fall of the Soviet Union, due to the 
peculiarity of its geographical location and the clashing geopolitical and economic interests of riparian states 
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(Dekmejian and Simonian, 2003, pp.19–20). However, Iran has been keen to sponsor a Caspian Sea 
Cooperation Organisation (Wastnidge, 2017, p. 9) – and over 20 years of negotiations led to the signing of 
the ‘Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea’ in August 2018, by the five littoral states. A key 
part of this agreement that Iran was keen to emphasise was the barring of military forces from non-littoral 
states in the Caspian, thus preserving a purely regional focus. For Iran this is significant, given the potential 
for extra-regional powers to exploit underlying tensions between Iran and its neighbours (as can be seen in 
Azerbaijan’s well-established cooperation with Israel, for example).  
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is perhaps the pre-eminent Eurasian regional consultative 
framework with a security dimension (Allison, 2004, p.478). The SCO can be seen as promoting greater 
multi-polarity, acting as a possible counterweight to American unilateralism. Iran currently has observer 
status, but has long lobbied for upgraded, full membership of the SCO, something which Russia supports. 
Though its record to date is largely declaratory rather than anything substantially tangible, the SCO does 
provide a mechanism for regional cooperation, and its focus on combating extremism is an aspect that Iran 
finds common cause with.  Naturally, a Chinese response to so-called extremism, as seen in its current 
campaign in Xinjiang, does not sit comfortably with the Islamic universalist outlook of states such as Iran 
and Saudi Arabia. However, with the exception of Turkey, key powers in the Islamic world have largely 
overlooked this, preferring expedient relations with the world’s next superpower.  The security focus of the 
SCO, and nascent plans for enhancing economic cooperation, do provide a common cause that is sufficiently 
depoliticized – thus enhancing the de-securitizing prospects for a ‘silencing’ (Hansen, 2012, p.529) of 
potentially insecure acts. Indeed, commentators have speculated that possible Iranian membership might act 
as a catalyst for Saudi Arabia and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council to request a seat at the SCO 
table (Fulton, 2018). The SCO already counts India and Pakistan as members, thus showing the potential 
utility of such a grouping in bringing adversarial nations with foreign policies based on strong identity 
narratives together. 
In a related vein, China’s Belt and Road initiative also provides a less politicised space for the pursuit of 
diplomatic engagement – both Iran and its Middle Eastern rivals, particularly the UAE, are seen by China as 
crucial nodes in the project. Here we have a possible example of economic cooperation being facilitated by 
an external power, China, which has a history of even-handedness towards the region, which has the potential 
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to act as a kind of arbiter in de-escalating tensions. This shows how movement towards cooperation in the 
economic realm may pay dividends for further accommodation. These are all of course still in line with 
Iran’s national interest and foreign policy outlook, which aims to maintain independence and reduce external 
(non-regional, i.e. US) influence in such areas. Cooperation within such initiatives has the potential to bring 
states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia together in a less politicised setting, with the diplomatic contacts and 
necessary engagement that such institutionalisation helps to foster. 
Iran draws on this experience of proactive engagement with regional groupings in Eurasia to promote 
regional security plans in the Middle East. It is this broadly positive experience, one that is cooperative and 
‘region first’ in its approach, that contributes to the Islamic Republic’s propensity to focus on regional 
answers to security problems in the Middle East. Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif has 
promoted regional solutions to Middle East security issues, tying them explicitly to issues around 
sectarianism, noting:  
It can perhaps start with a modest regional dialogue forum based on generally recognized principles 
and shared objectives. The forum can promote understanding on a broad spectrum of issues, 
including confidence and security building measures and combating terrorism, extremism and 
sectarianism. 
(Zarif, 2017) 
Zarif again emphasised the need for regional solutions through a mooted non-aggression pact in 2019, 
emphasising Iran’s ‘neighbours first’ outlook (IRNA, 2019). In addition, following the marked rise in Iran-
Saudi tensions around Persian Gulf shipping and oil infrastructure, Rouhani used his 2019 UN General 
Assembly address to call for a coalition of regional states to ensure the security of vessels transiting the 
Straits of Hormuz, in the so-called ‘HOPE’ initiative (Rouhani, 2019). In this manner, key Iranian diplomatic 
moves can be seen as articulating a rapprochement of the ‘friend-enemy distinction’, which Hansen (2012, 
p.533) emphasizes as a necessity for de-securitization. 
ii)  Approaches Drawing on Culture and Religion 
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The previously outlined efforts of Iran in multilateral diplomatic initiatives and participation in international 
organisations can be broadly understood as falling in line with the ‘pragmatic’ trend in Iranian foreign policy 
that has predominated since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. A less explored aspect of Iranian foreign 
policy and diplomacy that also has the potential to offer spaces for de-securitization is in the realm of its 
religious and cultural diplomacy initiatives. It is here where, contrary to accusations of Iran applying 
sectarian logic in this realm, arguably the richest potential for initiatives that support desectarianization 
exists. Iran’s attempts to enhance cultural relations with Central Asian states, such as through bilateral and 
institutionalised initiatives in organisations such as the Economic Cooperation Organisation (Wastnidge 
2014), show that non-sectarian approaches focusing on other commonalities can work and are utilised 
constructively by the Islamic Republic. Here, Iran is cognisant of the sensitivities of Central Asian states 
vis-à-vis political Islam and has quietly conducted a number of cultural and development projects in the 
region. 
In terms of historical attempts that provide a potential model, the ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’ initiative, 
as advanced by former President Mohammad Khatami, stands out as a notable example. In promoting 
dialogue alongside détente, Khatami’s use of this concept in Iran’s international relations helped to improve 
relations with Sunni Arab countries during the late 1990s.  International organisations including the United 
Nations were particularly useful as fora at which to promote the concept (Wastnidge, 2016), and the OIC in 
particular was key in terms of Iran trying to present the grouping as representative of Islamic civilisation 
(Anadi-Alamouti, 2002). The emphasis Khatami placed on dialogue and understanding, underpinned in part 
by the Habermasian concept of communicative action (Khaniki, 2007), shows the utility of a conceptual 
approach that stresses mutual understanding through speech acts as a means of solving conflict.  This was 
arguably a method of de-securitizing diplomacy that emphasized the importance of Iran’s cultural attachés 
and diplomatic staff as key interlocutors.  
Iran continues to use international organisations to call for international cooperation and dialogue, as seen 
in more recent times through Rouhani’s aforementioned WAVE proposal. It is also keen to emphasise its 
own homegrown attempts to bridge the sectarian divide, and it is here that concrete moves towards potential 
desectarianization can be most clearly observed. The Assembly for the Proximity of Islamic Schools of 
Thought was established by Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in 1990. Its primary aim is to 
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promote greater unity in Islamic Ummah. A key initiative of the Assembly is the annual Islamic Unity 
Conference, held in Tehran, which aims to promote: ‘…unity and solidarity in the Islamic World and unison 
among scholars in order to achieve proximity among their scientific and cultural viewpoints in terms of fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence), Usul (principles of jurisprudence), Kaläm (Islamic theology), and interpretation’ 
(Assembly for the Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought, 2019). This conference invites Muslim scholars 
from around the world to work together on issues of Islamic unity. While Iran’s leadership is not averse to 
using the event as a platform to admonish its regional rivals for their political alignments, as seen in the 
comments of Ayatollah Khamenei and President Rouhani at the 32nd annual conference in 2018, the 
Assembly represents an attempt by the Islamic Republic to work constructively towards greater unity 
between the various Islamic sects. There is great potential in such initiatives to act as platforms for de-
securitization. This is a form of de-securitization that is enhanced through religious diplomacy, and thus 
within such moves one can view the possibilities for desectarianization as a result. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have attempted to illustrate the insights provided by elements of de-securitization theory 
through processes of diplomatisation as applied to the case of Iran’s multilateral diplomacy. De-
securitization as a positive and effective process requires time and the willingness to facilitate a change in 
threat perception. Indeed, desecuritizing an issue needs the desire of actors and their efforts to pursue a 
change in the securitized context. Although desecuritization differs from one case, and region, to another, 
successful desecuritization in different regions makes it more likely to happen in different contexts, as 
witnessed in different regions such as Western and Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Any actions towards 
desectarianization and de-securitization would take substantial time in order to deconstruct the complex 
issues involved. For many of the proposed areas of cooperation, a depoliticized setting works best, and hence 
the viability of economic, religious and cultural initiatives to take the idea of de-securitization, and then 
potentially desectarianization, forward. A more traditionally defined, regional security plan would suit Iran’s 
resistance outlook, as it would be geared towards excluding forces external to the region – and therefore 
chimes with the independent outlook of Iranian foreign policy. However, it is not realistic to expect total US 
withdrawal from the Middle East in the near future, and the current situation, which sees a close alignment 
of US-Saudi-Emirati-Israel interests, primarily aimed against Iran, gives little optimism for such an 
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approach. Thus, in the present discourse, we see Iran attempting to take the moral high ground – promoting 
a region-first vision for security in the Middle East that is not dependent on external guarantors or forces. 
Potential diplomatic mechanisms that can help foster de-securitization are provided by membership of 
multilateral organisations, and Iran has been a regular partner in such groupings since the 1990s. These 
channels need to be utilised to enable de-securitization. Making a state the focus of security arrangements, 
as seen with the GCC’s and the US-Saudi-UAE-Israel alliance’s continued focus on Iran, involves a high 
degree of othering, which fuels sectarianization. As long as regional rulers perceive their rivals through a 
securitized lens and manipulate sectarian identities for their own survival, the diplomatic efforts towards de-
securitization cannot be assured of success. The emphasis of regional rulers on the rivalry with Iran for their 
political ends make the process of de-securitization, and beyond that desectarianization, more complicated 
than in the case of Iran’s Eurasian outreach, where the threat perception is less. The Islamic Republic, 
however, draws on this experience to inform its emphasis on multilateralism.  An inclusive regional security 
architecture based around common cause, threat or identity would allow a forum for cooperation and 
confidence building. This can start with initiatives such as non-aggression pacts and then be institutionalised 
further. The cultural and religious sphere is also replete with potential for desectarianization initiatives, as 
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